THEOLOGY PROPER: EXISTENCE OF GOD II - Page 1

1A. Cosmological Argument

1B.     Review of the Argument by Aquinas

1C.  The Argument From Motion: An Unmoved Mover

  "The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion.

  It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in this world

  some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in

  motion by another, for nothing can be in notion unless it is in

  potency to that towards which it is in motion. But a thing

  moves in so far as it is in act. For motion is nothing else

  than the reduction of something from potency to act. But

  nothing can be reduced from potency to act except by something

  in a state of act. . . .

Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover which is moved by no other. And this everyone understands to be God." Aquinas, Sum. Theolog., I Ques 2, Art. 3

NOTE:

2C.  The Argument From Causality: An Uncaused Caused

1D.     Insight From Aquinas

     "The second way is from the notion of efficient cause. In

     the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient

     causes. There is no case known (nor indeed, is it

     possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient

     cause of itself, because in that case it would be prior to

     itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it

     is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all

     efficient causes following in order, the first is the

     cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is

     the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate

     cause be several, or one only. Now to take away the cause

     is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no

     first cause among efficient causes, there will be no

     ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient

     causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be

     no first efficient cause, neither will there be an

     ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes,

     all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary

     to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives

     the name of God." Ibid.

2D. Instruction on the Nature of Causality 1E. Stated

1F.    "A cause is something. It has a real existence. It is not merely a name for a certain relation.

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It is a real entity, a substance. This is plain because a nonentity cannot act. If that which does not exist can be a cause; then nothing can produce something, which is a contradiction." Hodge, Sys. Theo., 1:209

2F.  "A cause must not only be something real, but it must have power or efficiency. There must be something in its nature to account for the effects which it produces." Ibid.

3F. "This efficiency must be adequate; that is, sufficient and appropriate to the effect. That this is a true view of the nature of a cause is plain." Ibid.

2E. Supported

1F. "From our own consciousness. We are causes. We can produce effects. And all three of the particulars above mentioned are included in our consciousness of ourselves as cause. We are real existences; we have power; we have power adequate to the effects which we produce." Ibid.

2F. "We can appeal to the universal consciousness of men. All men attach this meaning to the word cause in their ordinary language. All men assume that every effect has an antecedent to whose efficiency it is due. They never regard mere antecedence, however uniform in the past, or however certain in the future, as constituting a causal relation. The succession of the seasons has been uniform in the past, and we are confident that it will continue uniform in the future; yet not man says that winter is the cause of summer. Every one is conscious that cause expresses an entirely different relation from that of mere antecedence." Ibid. OBSERVATION:

3F.  "This view of the nature of causation is

     included in the universal and necessary belief,

     that every effect must have a cause. That

     belief is not that one thing must always go

     before another thing; but that nothing can

     occur, that no change can be produced, without

     the exercise of power or efficiency somewhere;

     otherwise something could come out of nothing."

     Ibid.

     POINT:

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3D.    Implication From the Nature of Causality

    "The language of every nation is formed on the connection

    between cause and effect. For in every language there are

    not only many words directly expressing ideas of this

    subject, such as cause, efficiency, effect, production,

    produce, effectuate, create, generate, etc., or words

    equivalent to these; but every verb in every language,

    except the intransitive impersonal verbs, and the verb

    substantive, involves, of course, causation or efficiency,

    and refers always to an agent, or cause, in such a manner,

    that without the operation of this cause or agent, the

    verb would have no meaning. ‑‑All mankind, except a few

    Antheistical and skeptical philosophers, have thus agreed

    in acknowledging this connection, and they (the skeptics]

    have acknowledged it as fully as others in their customary

    language" Timothy Dwight, Theo. Explained (1818) 1:5

4D.    Illustration of the Nature of Causality

    "If each link of the chain hangs on another, the whole

    will hang and only hang even in eternity, unsupported,

    like some stark serpent ‑ unless you find a hook for it.

    Add weakness to weakness, in any quantity, you will never

    make strength." Stirling, Phil & Theo., (1890) p. 262

    NOTE:

3C. The Argument From Contingency: A Necessary Being

1D.     Issue

     "The third way is taken from possibility and necessity,

     and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible

     to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated,

     and to be corrupted, and consequently they are possible to

     be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always

     to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some

     time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to

     be, then at one time there could have been nothing in

     existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be

     nothing in existence, because that which does not exist

     only begins to exist by something already existing.

     . . . Therefore we must admit the existence of some being

     having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it

     from another, but rather causing in others their

     necessity. This is what all men speak of as God." Aquinas,

     Sum Theolog I:Quest 2, Art. 3

2D. Implications 1E. Regarding Contingency "The intuitive credence that every effect must have a cause is‑the basic principle upon which the cosmological argument advances to its certain conclusions. Ex nihilo, nihil fit ‑ out of nothing, nothing can arise ‑ is an axiom which has been

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recognized by philosophers of all the ages. To assert that anything has caused itself to exist is to assert that it acted before it existed, which is an absurdity. Nonexistence cannot engender existence." Chafer, Sys. Theo. 1:144

2E.  Regarding Necessity

  "By the same logic or reasoning which demonstrates

  that the existing universe cannot produce itself by

  acting before it existed, so the First Cause is not

  self‑created, but is eternal and therefore self­

  existent, since He depends on nothing outside

  Himself, being caused by nothing." ibid., p. 146

4C. The Argument From Perfection: A Perfect Being

"The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in

things. Among beings there are some more and some less good,

true, noble, and the like. But "more" and "less" are

predicated of different things, according as they resemble in

their different ways something which is the maximum, as a

thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly

resembles that which is hottest. There is then, something

which is truest, something best, something noblest, and,

consequently, something which is most being; . . .

Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection. And this we call God." Aquinas, Sum. Theolog I, Ques 2, Art. 3 NOTE:

SC.  The Argument From Design: A Designer

     "The fifth way is taken from the governance of things. We see

     that things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act

     for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or

     nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best

     result. Hence it is plain that they achieve their end not by

     chance, but by design. Now whatever lacks knowledge cannot

     move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being

     endowed with knowledge and intelligence, as the arrow is

     directed by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being

     exists by whom all natural things are ordered to their end; and

     this being we call God." ibid.

2B.     Restatement of the Argument

1C. Explanation

1D.   "Contingent beings require a non‑contingent ground of being in order to exist.

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2D.   Contingent beings exist.

3D.   Therefore, a non‑contingent ground of being exists" (Halverson, p. 132).

2C., Elaboration

1D.  A contingent being is a finite being, a being which comes into existence and then passes away. We know that we exist today, but do we know that we will exist tomorrow? No, we do not. Therefore, our existence is contingent; it is not absolute.

2D. The argument states that for a contingent being to exist, there must be some absolute reality which accounts for contingent beings. Francis Schaeffer uses a type of this argument when he says that persons cannot come into being from an impersonal source.

3C.     Evaluation

     obviously, the philosopher can demonstrate the necessity for

     the existence of God. However, he is not entitled to use the

     presuppositions of faith in order to do so. He is not trying

     to picture the God of living faith, and sometimes his exact

     point is missed by a very religious person. God as the ground

     of being may seem to be remote, abstract, impersonal. The

     philosopher, however, is limited to concepts. Religious faith

     must fill in the details. Yet the task of philosophy is

     accomplished when it shows that God exists as the ground of

     being of finite things.

3B.     Refutation of the Argument

1C. Concerning intelligibility

1D.     Response

     The premise "some contingent beings exist," is either a

     truism or it is non‑intelligible. I say that it is not

     intelligible.

2D.  Reply

     "There are no self‑evident, intuitive truths, if the fact

     that they have been denied by one or more speculative

     philosophers be considered proof that they are not matters

     of universal and necessary belief. Personal identity, the

     real existence of the external world, the essential

     distinction between right and wrong, have all been denied.

     Nevertheless, all men do, and all men must believe these

     truths. The denial of them is forced and temporary.

     Whenever the mind reverts to its normal state, the belief

     returns. So the principle of causation has been denied;

     yet every man is forced by the constitution of his nature

     to admit it, and constantly to act upon it. A man may

     believe that the universe is eternal; but that it began to

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be without a cause ‑ that it sprang out of nothing ‑ it is impossible to believe.

We are reduced, therefore, to this alternative. The universe is. It therefore either has been from all eternity, or it owes its existence to a cause out of itself, adequate to account for its being what it is. The theistical argument is, that the world is an effect; that it has not the cause of existence in itself, that it is not eternal, and therefore we are necessitated to assume the existence of a great First Cause to whose efficiency the existence of the universe is to be referred." Hodge, Sys. Theo. 1:210‑11

2C. Concerning Logic

1D.     Response

     There is a jump in logic from physical objects to God. We

     cannot move beyond natural physical laws.

2D.     Reply

     "The argument, fairly proves that this Being is

     extramundane; for the principle of causation is that

     everything contingent must have the cause of its existence

     out of itself." Ibid., p. 215

     POINT:

3C. Concerning Contingency

1D.     Response

     What is wrong with an infinite series of contingent

     causes? or infinite space?

2D.     Reply

4C. Concerning Meaning

1D.     Response

     If it were true, the conclusion would make no difference in

     anyone's life.

2D.     Reply

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2A.     Teleological Argument

1B.    Review of the Argument

1C.    Delineation of Teleology

    "Teleology from telos, end, and logos, discourse, is the

    science of final causes, or Of purposes or design as exhibited

    in the adjustment of parts to wholes, of means to ends, of

    organs to uses in nature. It is also familiarly called the

    Argument from Design; and is ultimately based upon the

    recognition of the operations of an intelligent cause in

    nature." A. A. Hodge, Out. Theo., p. 35

2C. Definition of Design

     1D. Intention

          "By design is intended,

1E.      The selection of an end to be attained.

2E.      The choice of suitable means for its attainment.

3E. The actual application of those means for the accomplishment of the proposed end." Hodge, Sys. Theo. 1:216

2D.     Implication

     "Such being the nature of design, it is a self‑evident

     truth, or, even an identical proposition, that design is

     indicative of intelligence, will, and power. It is simply

     saying that intelligence in the effect implies

     intelligence in the cause." ibid.

3C. Description of the Argumentation 1D. Explained "There cannot be design without a designer, contrivance, without a contriver; order, without anything capable of arranging; subserviency and relation to a purpose, without that which could intend a purpose; means suitable to an end, and executing their office in accomplishing that end, without the end ever having been contemplated, or the means accommodated to it. Arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of instruments to a use, imply the presence of intelligence and mind." Wm. Paley, Evid. of the Exist. and Attrib. of the Deity in Halverson, Intro. Phil., pp. 163‑64 NOTE:

2D.     Elaborated

     "Every indication of contrivance, every manifestation of

     design, which existed in the watch, exists in the works of

     nature; with the difference, on the side of nature, of

     being greater and more, and that in a degree which exceeds

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all computation. ..The contrivances of nature surpass the contrivances of art, in the complexity, subtlety, and curiosity of the mechanism; and still more, if possible, do they go beyond them in number and variety: yet, in a multitude of cases, are not less evidently mechanical, not less evidently contrivances, not less evidently accommodated to their end, or suited to their office, than are the most perfect productions of human ingenuity." Ibid., p. 164

3D. Examples

1E. By William Paley:

2E.  By Cicero

     "Can anything be done by chance which has all the

     marks of design? Four dice may by chance turn up

     their aces; but, do you think that four hundred dice,

     when thrown by chance, will turn up four hundred

     aces? Colours, when thrown upon canvas without

     design, may have some resemblance to a human face,

     but do you think they could make a picture as

     beautiful as the Coan Venus? A hog, in turning up

     the ground with his nose, may make something in the

     form of the letter A; but do you think that a hog

     could describe, on the ground, the Andromache of

     Ennius?" cited in Chafer, Sys. Theo. 1: 154

3E.  By John Miley

     "The hull of a ship, masts, sails, anchors, rudder,

     compass, chart, have no necessary connection, and in

     relation to their physical causalities are

     heterogeneous phenomena. The future use of a ship is

     not contained in any one of them, but is possible

              through their combination. This combination in the

     fully equipped ship has no interpretation in our

     rational intelligence except in the previous

     existence of its use in human thought and purpose.

     The use of the ship, therefore, is not the mere

     result of its existence, but the final cause of its

     construction." Sys. Theo. 1: 90

4E.  By Paul Janet

     "Imagine a blind workman, hidden in a cellar, and

     destitute of all intelligence, who, merely yielding

     to the simple need of moving his limbs and his hands,

     should be found to have forged, without knowing it, a

     key adapted to the most complicated lock which can

     possibly be imagined. This is what nature does in

     the fabrication of the living being." Cited in

     Chafer, Sys. Theo. 1: 153

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2B. Restatement of the Argument

1C.   Position

   "The teleological argument may be stated as. follows: Order and

   useful arrangement in a system imply intelligence and purpose

   in the originating cause; the universe is characterized by

   order and useful arrangement; therefore the universe has an

   intelligent and free cause." Thiessen, Lec. Sys. Theo., p. 59

2C.   Premises

1D.  Minor Premise

  "The minor premise expresses a working‑principle of all

  science, namely, that all things have their uses, that

  order pervades the universe, and that the methods of

  nature are rational methods." Strong, Sys. Theo., p. 77

3D.  Conclusion

  What we find in nature calls for some kind of explanation.

  The analogy between the order in nature and the order in

  objects known to be the product of an intelligent purpose

  is stronger than any other analogy.

3B.     Refutation of the Argument

1C.     From Experience

1D.  Response

  "Hume's answer to the argument from design, or final

  causes, is, that our knowledge is limited by experience.

  We have often seen houses, ships, engines, and other

  machines made, and therefore, when we see similar products

  of human skill we are authorized to infer that they too

  were constructed by an intelligent author. But the world

  belongs to an entirely different category; we have never

  seen a world made; and therefore we have no rational

  ground for assuming that this world had a maker." Hodge,

  Sys. Theo. 1:228

2D.  Reply

  "What experience teaches is that design implies

  intelligence; i.e., that we never see the adaptation of

  means to an end without having evidence that such

  adaptation is the work of an intelligent agent. And,

  therefore, even under the guidance of experience we infer

  that wherever we see design, whether in nature or in art,

  there must be an intelligent agent. But experience is not

  the ground or limit of this conviction. It is an

  intuitive truth, self‑evident from its nature, that design

  cannot be accounted for on the ground of chance or

  necessity. Let any man try to persuade himself that a

  watch is the product of chance, and he will see how futile

  is the attempt." Ibid.

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2C. From the Evolutionary Theory

1D. Response

Recent scientific thinkers have argued that the Darwinian

principle of natural selection blunts the force of this

argument. Thus, they say, there is no longer a need for

divine intelligence to explain the ordering or adaptation

of means to ends.

2D. Reply

"Consider the following remarkable facts about the world

as we know it:

1E.  The world is intelligible in a very high degree. The world, somehow or other, is capable of being understood by means of the logical and mathematical categories of the human mind.

2E.  The evolutionary process, which posits "chance" mutations whose survival depends on their suitability to enhance the organism in its struggle for life, has operated as if it were intended to produce variety, beauty, mind, and intelligence.

3E.  The inorganic world, which according to current theory existed for hundreds of millions of years before life emerged on our planet, is remarkably well adapted ‑ physically, chemically, thermally, and so on ‑ to the maintenance of life.

4E.  Nature has developed in such a way that there are numerous phenomena that elicit in man a sense of beauty.

5E.  The conditions of human life have developed in such a way that man is able to postulate, pursue, and to a high degree achieve moral ideals.

6E.  How are we to account for these remarkable facts? What hypothesis will do justice to the truly astonishing fact that out of a mass of inorganic matter there has emerged, through a process that might have worked in countless other directions, not only life (which is remarkable enough in itself) but a being possessing intelligence, morality, and a sense of beauty? Say, if you will, that it is all a matter of chance, that the laws of nature had to produce some kind of world, and that this just happened to be the one that developed. I for one do not believe it. If this world evolved by a "throw of the dice" then I cannot escape the conclusion that the dice were loaded." Halverson, Intro. Phil., p. 165

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3C.    From the Premise of the Argument

1D.     Response

     The premise "nature demonstrates a number of instances of

     means ordered to ends" is ambiguous. Nature displays "a

     high degree of law like regularity". However, the

     statement seems to suggest that we ought necessarily to

     look for a "purposer" or an "orderer." This is not

     factually true.

2D.     Reply:

4C.  From the Implication of the Argument

1D.     Response

     The law like regularity of nature is what is constant. It

     is what enables men to make watches. There is no need to

     bring in intelligence.

2D.     Reply:

5C.  From the Conclusion

1D.     First Response

     If the argument were true, it would only prove the

     existence of an infinitely wise, but finitely powerful

     architect, because an inventor does not create the

     materials out of which the machine is made. If the

     argument is sound, it only requires the cosmic architect

     to be wise and powerful; it in no way assures us that he

     or it is infinite. The argument likewise proves nothing

     of the goodness of the architect.

2D.     First Reply

3D.     Second Response

     If the argument did establish the architect's existence,

     it would only establish his past existence. It says

     nothing of a world ‑ maker today.

4D.     Second Reply

6C.  From the Interpretation of the Argument

1D.     Response

     The argument is weak because it unites the natural wonder

     of viewing nature with the kindred feeling of reverence

     which religious people find satisfying.

2D.  Reply