THEOLOGY PROPER: EXISTENCE OF GOD I - Page 1

1A.     Approach to God's Existence

1B.     Definition of God

     1C. Difficulty With the Definition

2C. Deficient Definitions

1D.     Considered Generally

     "The word God is often used in a pantheistic sense, for

     the impersonal, unconscious ground of all being, and by

     many for the unknowable first cause of the existent world.

     It is for this reason that so many speculators, who

     actually or virtually deny the existence of the God of

     Christendom, yet indignantly repudiate the charge of

     atheism, because they admit the existence of a self­

     existent substance or first cause to which they give the

     name God, while they deny to it the possession of the

     Properties generally designated by the term." A. A.

     Hodge, Out. Theo., p. 29

2D. Considered Specifically 1E. "The idea of the personalized, idealized whole of reality, similar to the idea of Uncle Sam," Edward Ames, quoted in Thiessen, Lec. Sys. Theo. p. 52

2E.   "mind and personality would cramp God's style." Henry Thiessen, Ibid.

3C.     Definition of the Definition

1D.     Explanation

     "If by definition we mean a complete view, so that the

     subject can be properly grasped, so that we can

     understand, and, so to speak, exhaust it, we must all say

     that we cannot give a definition of deity. In this sense

     to define God would be to circumscribe Him. But the word

     definition is used in other senses. There are two chief

     senses in which we may answer the question in the

     affirmative.

     1E.     (1) An enumeration of the essential attributes or

          predicates of any being, substance or thing.

     2E.     (2) The logical definition, which consists in giving

          the genus and differentia of any subject. In both

          these cases, we may attain at least a proximate

          apprehension of what God is." Smith, Sys. Chr.

          Theo., p. 7

2D.     Elaboration

     "we may know a thing correctly so far as we know it, even

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though we do not know all about it.... We can ... state the genus to which God belongs and note the differentia, that distinguish Him from others of the genus." Thiessen, Lec. Sys. Theo., p. 54

4C. Distinctions in the Definition

"Thus he is as to genus, an intelligent personal Spirit. He

is, as to his specific difference, as to that which constitutes

him God, infinite, eternal, unchangeable in his being, in his

wisdom, in his power, in his holiness, and in all perfections

consistent with his being." *A. A. Hodge, Out. Theo., p. 30

2B. Defense of the Arguments for 'God's Existence

1C. Position of the Evidentialist

1D.  In Relation to the Arguments

  1E.  "These arguments are of value as analyses and

    scientific verifications of the mental processes

    implicitly involved in the spontaneous recognition of

    the self‑manifestations of God.

  2E.  They are of use also for the purpose of vindicating

    the legitimacy of the process against the criticisms

    of skeptics.

  3E.  The various arguments are convergent rather than

    consecutive. They do not all establish the same

    elements of the theistic conception, but each

    establishes independently its separate element, and

    thus is of use.

    1F.  in contributing confirmatory evidence that God

      is

    2F.  complementary evidence as to what God is" A. A.

      Hodge, Out. Theo., p. 32

2D. In Relation to Goodness and Causality

"Although causality does not involve design, nor design

goodness, design involves causality, and goodness both

causality and design. The proofs of intelligence are also

proofs of power; and the proofs of goodness are proofs of

both intelligence and power. The principles of reason

which compel us to think of the Supreme Moral Intelligence

as self‑existent, eternal, infinite, and unchangeable

Being, supplement the proofs from other sources, and give

self‑consistency and completeness to the doctrine of

theism." Prof. Flint, quoted in A. A. Hodge, Out Theo.,

p. 32

2C. Perspective of the Fideist

1D.     Influence of Augustine

1E.     Credo ut intelligam:     "I believe in order that I may

     understand." The starting point is faith, though the

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exercise of faith presupposes a certain degree of understanding.

2E.   "A saint must believe in order to know ‑ but after he has believed he must endeavor to know as much as possible."

2D. Insight from Presuppositionalism

"the good need no proof that God is, and that the wicked

are not susceptible of conviction. You cannot prove that

a thing is beautiful, or that it is good. So‑neither can

you prove that there is a God." Hodge, Sys. Theo. 1:202

NOTE:

3D.     Illustrations     

     1E.                      

2E.          

3C.  POINT: "The arguments are not designed so much to prove the existence of an unknown being, as to demonstrate that the Being who reveals himself to man in the very constitution of his nature must be all that Theism declares him to be." Ibid., p. 203

2A.     Intuition

1B.     Innate Ideas

1C.  Question:

2C.  Answer

     1D.  No ‑ "it is evident that there are no 'innate' ideas in

          the sense that any child was ever born with a conception

          of the divine being, or any other conception already

          formed in his mind." A. A. Hodge, Out. Theo., p. 30

2D. Yes ‑ "It is innate in so much as the evidence is as universally present as the light of day, and the process by which it is apprehended is constitutional." Ibid., p. 31

2B.  The Intuitive Process

1C.     Elements

     "Necessity and universality are infallible tests for

     distinguishing pure from empirical knowledge, and are

     inseparably connected with each other." Kant, Crit. Pure

     Reason, quoted in Thiessen, p. 55

1D.     Universality

     1E. Stated

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2E. supported, Rom. 1:19‑21, 2:15

2D. Necessity 1E. Explanation "The belief in the existence of God is also necessary. it is necessary in the sense that we cannot deny His existence without doing violence to the very laws of our nature. If we do deny it, the denial is forced and can only be temporary." Thiessen, Lec. Sys. Theo.,  p. 56

2E.  Example

  "just as the pendulum of a clock can be pushed off

  center by an internal or external force, so a man can

  be pushed off his normal belief in the existence of

  God. But just as the pendulum returns to its

  original position when the pressure is removed, so a

  man returns to his normal belief in God when he is

  not consciously under the influence of a false

  philosophy. Ibid.

2C. Evaluation

1D. Negatively 1E. "Although the recognition of the divine existence is necessary in the sense that the great majority of men recognize the truth, and are unable to disbelieve it even when they wish, and no one can do so without doing violence to his nature, yet it is not necessary to thought in the sense that the non‑existence of God is unthinkable.

2E.   Because God manifests himself to us not immediately but mediately through his works, and there is always present, at least implicitly, an inference in the act whereby the soul recognizes his presence and action.

3E.   The true idea of God is exceedingly complex, and is reached by a complex process, whether spontaneous or not, involving various elements capable of analysis and description." A. A. Hodge, Out. Theo., p. 31

2D.     Positively

     "On the other hand it is true that God manifests himself

     in his working in our souls and in external nature just as

     the invisible souls of our fellow‑men manifest themselves,

     and we spontaneously recognize him just as we do them."

     Ibid.

3D.     Conclusion

     "The recognition of the self‑manifest God is spontaneous,

     and universal, which proves the evidence to be clear and

     everywhere present, and convincing to all normally

     developed men." Ibid., p. 30

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3A. The Ontological Argument   

1B. Context of the Argument

1C.  Historically

  "St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033‑1109) was one of the few truly

  original thinkers who appeared during the long interval between

  St. Augustine (354‑430) and St. Thomas Aquinas (1225‑1275).

  Like St. Augustine, whom he sought to emulate, St. Anselm

  conceived his role to be that of an apologist for Christian

  orthodoxy. All his writings reflect his theological and

  apologetic concerns; indeed, he did not make a hard and fast

  distinction between theology and philosophy. However, in two

  of his writings, the Monologium and the Proslogium, he advanced

  a number of arguments for the existence of God. These are*

  worthy of study in themselves, quite apart from the apologetic

  context out of which they arose." Halverson, Concise Intro.

  Phil., p. 147

2C.  Logically

1D. A Priori  Argument:  

2D. A Posteriori  Argument:

3D. POINT:    

2B.           Conception of the Argument:

     "Even the fool is convinced that something exists in the

     understanding, at least, than which nothing greater can be

     conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. And

     whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly

     that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in

     the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the

     understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality;

     which is greater. Therefore, if that, than which nothing greater

     can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being,

     than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a

     greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence,

     there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing

     greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding

     and in reality. There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing

     greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived

     not to exist." Proslogium, pp. 8‑9

3B.     Consideration of the Argument

1C.  God is the greatest possible being.

2C.   The greatest possible being exists in the human understanding whether or not man affirms or denies God's existence.

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3C.      It is possible to conceive of the greatest possible being existing not only in the understanding, but in reality as well, and the latter is greater.

4C.      Here is the crux of the entire argument. It states that we can distinguish in thought between a being which exists only in our mind and a being that exists both in our mind and in reality. It also asserts that a being of the latter kind is greater than one of the former. Can we make this distinction?

5C.      According to the scholastics, things exist in intellect. in the understanding. That is, a clear idea (not a mental picture) of the thing exists; a person, in other words understands a description that someone gives him.

6C.      Also, things exist in re, in reality, as opposed to imaginary existence. The satyr cannot exist in reality because of the contradictory nature of its definition. The satyr, then, exists in intellect but not in re. The sun exists in both senses, for we can verify that it exists in the world. Also, there are real things which are not yet discovered that exist in re but not in intellect. Finally there are unreal fantasies which no one has yet dreamed of which right now exist in neither sense.

7C.      Now God clearly exists in intellect, in the understanding of men, if they are not fools, for anyone but a fool can grasp the idea of "a being of such greatness that no greater being could possible be, or even be conceived."

Anselm is arguing that if God also exists in re, then He is

greater or more perfect or superior than      He only exists in

intellect.

8C.      If the greatest possible being exists only in the understanding, it is not the greatest possible being.

9C.     Therefore, the greatest possible being also exists in reality.

10C.      Only in the case of the greatest possible being does this reasoning apply. one does not need to find such a being for the statement to be true. God must exist because of the very nature of the concept of God. His existence is a logical necessity. Therefore, one who denies His existence makes an error of fact and a logical error.

4B.    Comment by Anselm

    "So truly, therefore, dost thou exist, 0 Lord, my God, that thou

    canst not be conceived not to exist; and rightly. For, if a mind

    could conceive of a being better than thee, the creature would rise

    above the Creator; and this is most absurd. And, indeed, whatever

    else there is, except thee alone, can be conceived not to exist.

    To thee alone, therefore, it belongs to exist more truly than all

    other beings, and hence in a higher degree than all others. For,

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whatever else exists does not exist so truly, and hence in a less degree it belongs to it to exist. Why, then, has the fool said in his heart, there is no God (Psalm xiv. 1) , since it is so evident, to a rational mind, that thou dost exist in the highest degree of all? Why, except that he is dull and a fool?

I thank thee, gracious Lord, I thank thee; because what I formerly believed by thy bounty, I now so understand by thine illumination.

5B. Critique of the Argument

1C.     First Objection

     "Gaunilo, a monk in Anselm's day, contended that the fact that

     he could conceive of a perfect island did not mean such an

     island actually existed." Geisler/Feinberg, Intro. Phil.

     p. 290

2C.  Reply

     "Anselm insisted in response that an island by definition need

     not be absolutely perfect in the same sense that God by

              definition must be absolutely perfect. Therefore a "perfect"

     island might exist in the mind but not in reality, but God, to

     be perfect, must exist in reality." Ibid­

     ALSO:

3C.  Second Objection

     "The second criticism is held more widely to be decisive.

     Immanuel Kant insisted that Anselm wrongly assumed that

     existence is a property of perfection. On the contrary, said

     Kant, existence is not a predicate or attribute of a concept.

     Anselm assumed that the concept must be instantiated, that is,

     that an example of it had to be found in experience or reality.

     But since existence is not a property of perfection, then

     posting God's non‑existence takes nothing away from the

     absolute perfection of the idea in one's mind. In short, it is

     possible that God does not exist. And if this is so, then it

     is not rationally necessary that God exists. No one,

     therefore, can use this argument to claim that God exists for

     certain." Ibid.

6B.     Concluding Remarks on the Argument

1C.     Positive Aspect

     "It is evident therefore that the human mind cannot rid itself

     of the idea of the absolute. It persists in the implicit

     consciousness, regulating thought, even when theoretically

     disclaimed. It is evident that without the assumption,

     explicit or implicit, that the absolute Being exists, the

     reason of man cannot solve its necessary problems, nor rest

     satisfied with any intellectual attainment, nor hold

     steadfastly to the reality of its knowledge, nor know the

     continuity, the unity and reality of the universe. The

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necessary conclusion is that the principle that the absolute Being exists is a primitive and necessary law of thought, a constituent element of reason, and a necessary postulate in all thinking about being." Harris, Self‑Revel. of God, pp. 163‑64

2C. Negative Aspect

1D.     Self‑Defeating

     "If this argument has any validity, it is unimportant. it

     is only saying that what must be actually is. If the idea

     of God as it exists in every man's mind includes that of

     actual existence, then so far as the idea goes, he who has

     the one has the other. But the argument does not show how

     the ideal implies the real." Hodge, Sys. Theo. 1:189

2D.     Skeptical Response

     "No instance is however I believe on record of an Atheistic

     conversion having been produced by this process, and it

     may be ranked among the over zealous attempts of the

     advocates of truth. It is well intentioned, but

     unsatisfactory, … it has probably been

     mischievous in its effects by inducing a skepticism not

     arising out of the nature of the case, but from the

     imperfect and unsatisfactory investigations of the human

     understanding, pushed beyond the limit of its powers."

     Watson, Theolog. Inst., 1:330