| World Views |
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| Class #1 | |
| Prof. Ken L. Sarles | |
THEISM
I - Page 1
1A. Denial of the Knowledge of God's
Existence
1B.
Absolutely Denial That God Exists:
Atheism
1C.
Definition
1D.
Stated
"Atheism, according to its etymology, signifies a denial
of the being of God. It was applied by the ancient
Greeks to Socrates and
other philosophers, to indicate
that they failed to conform to the popular religion.
In
the same sense it was
applied to the early Christians.
Since the usage of the term Theism has been definitely
fixed in all modern languages, atheism necessarily
stands
for a denial of the existence
of a personal
Creator
and
Moral Governor. Notwithstanding that the belief in a
personal God is the
result of a spontaneous recognition
of God as manifesting
himself in consciousness and the
works of nature, atheism is still possible as an abnormal
state of consciousness induced by sophistical speculation
or by the indulgence of sinful passions,"
A. A. Hodge
Out. Theo., p. 46
2D.
Source
"In view of the semen
religion is implanted in every man
by his creation in the image of God, it is safe to assume
that no one is born an atheist. In the last analysis
atheism results from the perverted moral state of man and
from his desire to escape from God. It is deliberately
blind to and suppresses the most fundamental instinct of
man, the deepest needs of the soul, the highest
aspirations of the human spirit, and the longings of a
heart that gropes after some higher Being. This
practical or intellectual suppression of the operation of
the semen religion is often involves prolonged and painful
struggles." Berkhof, Sys. Theo., p. 22
2C. Delineation
1D. Dogmatic
Atheism
1E. Affirmation
"Dogmatic Atheism is the type that openly professes
atheism. Most people do not boldly flaunt their
atheism before men, for the term is one of reproach;
but there are some who do not shrink from declaring
themselves atheists." Theissen, Lec. Sys. Theo., p.
65
2E. Appraisal
"The atheistic position is a very unsatisfactory,
unstable, and arrogant one. It is unsatisfactory,
because all atheists lack the assurance of the
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forgiveness
of their sins; they all have a cold and empty life; and they all know nothing of
peace and fellowship with God. it is unstable, because it is contrary to man's
deepest convictions. Both Scripture and history show that man necessarily and
universally believes in the existence of God. The virtual atheist testifies to
this fact in that he adopts an abstraction to account for the world and its
life. It is arrogant, because it really pretends to be omniscient.
Limited knowledge can infer the existence of God, but exhaustive knowledge of
all things, intelligences, and times is needed to state dogmatically that there
is none. The dogmatic atheist is to be explained as being in an all normal
condition." Ibid., pp. 65‑66
POINT:
2D. Practical Atheism
1E. Among Non‑Christians 1F.
Description "They are not necessarily notoriously wicked in the eyes of
men, but may belong to the so-called "decent men of the world," though
respectably indifferent to spiritual things. Such people are often quite
conscious of the fact that they are out of harmony with God, dread to think of
meeting Him, and try to forget about Him. They seem to take a secret delight in
parading their atheism when they have smooth sailing, but have been known to get
down on their knees for prayer when their life was suddenly endangered."
Berkhof, Sys. Theo., p.
22
2F. Defense
1G. Ps. 10:4
2G.
Ps. 14:1
3G. Rom. 3:10‑12, 18
2E.
Among Christians
1F.
Evidence
1G. Regarding Our Salvation "No
practical atheist ever yet turned to God, but was turned by God; and not to
acknowledge it to God is a part of this atheism, since it is a robbing God of
the honor of one of his most glorious works. If this practical atheism be
natural to man ever since the first taint of nature in Paradise, what can be
expected from it, but a resisting of the work of God, and setting up all the
forces of nature
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against
the operations of grace, till a day of power dawn and clear up upon the soul?
Not all the angels in heaven, or men upon earth, can be imagined to be able to
persuade a man to fall out with himself; nothing can turn the tide of nature,
but a power above nature. God took away the sanctifying Spirit from man, as a
penalty for the first sin; who can regain it but by his will and pleasure? who
can restore it, but he that removed it? Since every man hath the same
fundamental atheism in him by nature, and would be a rule to himself and his own
end, he is so far from dethroning himself, that all the strength of his
corrupted nature is alarmed up to stand to their arms upon any attempt God makes
to regain the fort.
*
* Man cannot rise to an acknowledgment of God without God; hell may as well
become heaven, the devil be changed into an angel of light. . . .
An atheist by nature can no more
alter his own temper, and engrave in himself the divine nature, than a rock can
carve itself into the statue of a man. . . .
That soul that by nature would strip
God of his rights, cannot, without a divine power, be made conformable to him,
and acknowledge sincerely and cordially the rights and glory of god."
Charnock, Exist. & Attrib. of God, 1:165‑66
1G.
Regarding Our Sanctification
"Let us be sensible of it is ourselves.
Have any of our hearts been a soil wherein
the fear and reverence of God hath
naturally grown? Have we a desire to know
him, or a will to embrace him? Do we
delight in his will, and love the
remembrance of his name? Are our respects
to him, as God, equal to the speculative
knowledge we have of his nature? Is the
heart, wherein he hath stamped his image,
reserved for his residence? . . .
Have there not been frequent
neglects of God? Have we not been deaf whilst he hath knocked at our doors?
slept when he hath sounded in our ears, as if there have been
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no such being as a God in the world?
How many strugglings have been against our approaches to him! Hath not folly
often been committed, with vain imaginations starting up in the time of
religious service, which we would scarce vouchsafe a look to at another time,
and in another business, but would have thrust them away with indignation? Had
they stept in to interrupt our worldly affairs, they would have been troublesome
intruders; but while we are with God they are acceptable guests.
. . . Are not our minds bemisted
with an ignorance of him, our wills drawn by aversion from him, our affections
rising in distaste of him? more willing to know anything than his nature, and
more industrious to do anything than his will? Do we not all fall under some one
or other of these considerations? Is it not fit, then, that we should have a
sense of them? it is to be bewailed by us, that so little of God is in our
hearts, when so many evidences of the love of God are in the creatures; that God
should be so little our end, who hath been so much our benefactor; that he
should be so little in our thoughts, who sparkles in everything which presents
itself to our eyes." Ibid., pp. 167‑68
2F.
Exhortation
"Let us labor to be sensible of this
atheism in our nature, and be humbled for
it. How should we lie in the dust, and go
bowing under the humbling thoughts of it
all our days I Shall we not be sensible of
that whereby we spill the blood of our
souls, and give a stab to the heart of our
own salvation? Shall we be worse than any
creature, not to bewail that which tends
to our destruction?
. . . Let us, therefore, be truly
sensible of it, till the consideration draw tears from our eyes and sorrow from
our souls; let us urge the thoughts of it upon our hearts till the core of that
pride be eaten out, and our stubbornness changed into humility; till our heads
become waters, and our eyes fountains of tears, and be a spring of prayer to God
to change
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the
heart, and mortify the atheism in it; and consider what a sad thing it is to be
a practical atheist: and who is not so by nature?" Ibid., pp. 167‑68
2B.
Relatively ‑‑ Denial That God's Existence Can Be Known:
Agnosticism
1C.
Explanation 'gas the etymology of the word implies, agnosticism is simply not
knowing. Its objective is to discredit certitude in the field of human
knowledge. It is an attack upon man's mental powers and engenders a distrust in
the common facts and forces of human existence. It is negative in every
particular and therefore destructive in its effect upon truth which is gained by
the normal functions of the human faculties. Agnostics discard reasonable
proofs, which process, if followed consistently, would eliminate the very proofs
they advance for their own theories." Chafer, Sys. Theo., 1:165
NOTE:
2C.
Evaluation
"It is impossible for the Agnostic to limit his knowledge to
experience, and to reject as unverified the implications of
experience, without abandoning nearly all that he holds true.
If he sticks to his principle, his creed will be a short one.
Consciousness is confined to the present moment. How do I
know that my fellow‑men whom I see about me have minds like my
own? The senses cannot perceive the intelligence of the
friends about me. I infer that they are intelligent, but in
this inference I transcend experience. Experience reduced to
its exact terms, according to the methods of Agnosticism, is
confined to the present feeling, ‑‑ the feeling of the
transient
moment. When the Agnostic goes beyond this, when he infers
that what is remembered was once presented in consciousness,
that his fellow‑men are thinking beings, and not mindless
puppets, that any intelligent beings exist outside of himself,
he transcends experience. if he were to predicate
intelligence of God, he would be guilty of no graver
assumption than when he ascribes intelligence to the fellow
men whom he sees moving about, and with whom he is
conversing. Fisher, Gods of Theistic & Chr,. Belief, pp. 78—79
OBSERVATION:
2A. Denial of All Knowledge: Skepticism
1B. Aspects of Skepticism
1C. Absolute Skepticism
1D. The Academics
"Most likely, skepticism as a
philosophical methodology
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was
developed by the leaders of Plato's Academy in the third century B.C. The
Academics, as they were called, rejected Plato's metaphysical and mystical
doctrines. Rather, they concentrated on what they thought was paramount in
Socrates' remark, 'All that I know is that I know nothing.'" Geisler,
Feinberg, Intro. to Phil., P. 85
2D.
Sextus Empiricus (250‑325 A.D.)
1E. Background
"Little is known of him, except that he was probably
Greek, because he seemed to know the subtleties of the
language. He also knew details about Rome, Athens,
and Alexandria, but we do not know where he was born,
where he taught, or where he died. We do know that
he practiced medicine." Ibid.
2E. Thought
1F. The first stage is antithesis.
2F. "The second state is epoche, or the suspension
of judgment. Instead of either asserting or
‑denying any one claim about the subject at hand,
one must embrace all mutually inconsistent
claims and withhold judgment on each of them.
3F. The final stage is ataraxia, a state of
unperturbedness happiness, and peace of mind.
When that occurs one is freed from dogmatism.
He can live peacefully and undogmatically in the
world, following his natural inclinations and
the laws or customs of society."
3D. David Hume (1711‑76) 1E. Life
"He was born in Edinburgh and entered the university there at the age of
twelve, leaving two or three years later. He enjoyed a chequered career which
included tutorship to a lunatic, secretaryship to a general, and a librarianship
in Edinburgh. For a time he was attached to the British embassy in France, and
became a familiar figure in the Parisian scene. On returning to London, he
brought over Jean Jacques Rousseau, who rewarded him with charges that he was
out to kill him." Brown, Phil. & Chr. Faith, p. 67
2E.
Philosophy 1F. Concerning Cause/Effect 1G. Exposition "Before we are
reconciled to this doctrine, how often must we repeat to ourselves, that the
simple view of any two objects or actions, however related, can never give us
any idea of power, or of a connexion
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betwixt
them: that this idea arises from a repetition of their union: that the
repetition neither discovers nor causes anything in the objects, but has an
influence only on the mind, by that customary transition that it produces: that
this customary transition is therefore the same with the power and necessity;
which are consequently qualities of perceptions, not of objects, and are
internally felt by the soul, and not perceived externally in bodies?" Hume,
Treatise on Hum. Nat., 1:3:14
2G. Elaboration
"In other words, all that we are in the
habit of thinking of as cause and effect is
really a matter of sequence. It is not
something that happens between objects. It
is really a habit of mind." Brown, Phil.
&
Chr. Faith,
pp. 68‑69
2F. Concerning Miracles 1G. Expression
"A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and
unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle
from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience
can possibly be imagined." Hume, Enquiry into the Nat. of Hum.
Understanding, 10:90
2G. Explanation
"Thus miracles can never be appealed to
as
the foundation of a religion. They can
never be used to establish faith. They can
be swallowed only by those who have enough
faith already." Brown, Phil. &
the Chr.
Faith, p. 70
3F. Concerning God's Existence
"Hume pointed out that we are not entitled to
attribute to a cause any capacities other than
those necessary to produce the effect in
question. And we are not entitled to attribute
to a first cause (even if such a thing could be
established) moral attributes." Ibid., p. 69
NOTE:
4F. Consequence for Hume
"Most fortunately it happens that since reason
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is
incapable of dispelling these clouds, Nature
herself
suffices to that purpose, and cures me
of
this philosophical melancholy and delirium,
either
by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some
avocation
and lively impression of my senses,
which
obliterate all these chimeras. I dine, I
play
a game of backgammon, I converse, and am
merry
with my friends; and when, after three or
four
hours' amusement, I would return to these
speculations,
they appear so cold, and strained,
and
ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart
to
enter into them any further." Hume, Treatise
on
Hum Nat., 1:4:7
POINT:
2C. Limited
Skepticism
1D.
A. J. Ayer (1910‑70), Language, Truth, and Logic
1E.
Explanation: The Principle of Empirical Verification "the heart of
the verification principle is this: Any statement for which we cannot state the
conditions that would count for or against its truth, is not a statement about
reality, and hence cannot be knowledge.
Given the verification principle,
Ayer and others argue that metaphysics can, once and for all, be eliminated.
Since metaphysical disputes or claims cannot be evaluated in the light of
empirical evidence, they are not genuine claims about reality. As a matter of
fact, Ayer put it in even stronger language. metaphysics is not just false; it
is meaningless." Geisler/Feinberg, Intro. to Phil., p. 90.
2E.
Evaluation:
2D. Anthony Flew
1E. Parable of the Gardner
"He tells of two explorers who find a
garden in the
middle of the jungle. In this garden there
are many
flowers and many weeds. One explorer claims
that
there must be a gardener who tends the plot,
while
the other explorer denies it. They set a
watch, but
nothing happens. The believing explorer still
affirms his belief in a gardener, but
suggests that
the gardner is invisible. The two explorers
set up
an electrified barbed‑wire fence and
patrol it with
bloodhounds. Still nothing happens. The wires
never
sway, and the bloodhounds never bark. The
believer
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maintains
his belief in the gardener. The gardener, so he argues, is invisible,
intangible, and insensitive to electric shocks. He has no scent and makes no
sound, but he loves and tends the garden. Finally, the skeptic despairs and asks
the believer how his gardener differs from no gardener at all." Ibid., pp.
90‑91
2E.
Problem with the Parable
2B.
Appraisal of Skepticism
1C.
Logically
1D. It is Rationally Inconsistent as
developed by Augustine in
his Contra Academicos
"The skeptic's assertion that we
cannot know anything is
itself a claim about knowledge. If the
skeptic's claim is
false, then we need not worry about the
skeptic's charge.
On the other hand, if it is true, then
his position is
self‑contradictory, because we
know at least one thing‑
that we cannot know anything." Ibid.,
p. 94
2D. It Is Practically Inconsistent
The skeptic is never for real. There he
stands, cocktail
in hand, left arm draped languorously
on one end of the
mantelpiece, telling you that he can't
be sure of
anything, not even of his own
existence. I'll give you my
secret method of demolishing universal
skepticism in four
words. Whisper to him: "Your fly
is open." If he thinks
knowledge is so all‑fired
impossible, why does he always
look? Carpon cited in Sire, Univer.
Next Dr., p. 88
2C.
Philosophically
1D. It
Is meaningless
"The argument from non‑vacuous contrast. To be
meaningful, any statement must exclude some states of
affairs. In other words, an assertion must not be
compatible with every state of affairs. Thus, 'not
knowing' must distinguish a state of affairs which is
different than 'knowing.' If, however, all states of
affairs are 'not‑knowing,' as the skeptic claims, then his
whole claim is meaningless. 'Not‑knowing' would not
exclude any states of affairs." Geisler/Feinberg, Intro.
to Phil., p.
94
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2D. It Contradicts Common Sense
1E. Background
"Thomas
Reid (1710‑1796), a contemporary of David
Hume,
was one of the first to appreciate the
skeptical
import of Hume's arguments. . . .
Reid recognized that given Hume's
assumptions, Hume's logic was unassailable. At the same time Reid considered
Hume's conclusions clearly false. Thus, Reid bet about to challenge Hume's
assumptions." Ibid., pp. 95‑96
2E.
Basis IF. Subject‑object Distinction "Reid pointed out that all
languages carefully distinguish among the terms that describe the process of
perceiving, the mind which perceives, and the object perceived." Ibid., p.
96
2F. intuitive Foundation of Knowledge
"Reid argued that rational proofs of belief are
inappropriate, for they would demand an infinite
regress of justifications (each justification
would itself need a rational justification, ad
infinitum). Reid also claimed that these basic
beliefs are not rooted in blind prejudice, as
Hume supposed. Rather they reflect the very
constitution of our rationality, and thus are
known through intuition, not demonstration.
These beliefs form the basis of all other
proofs, but themselves cannot be proved." Ibid.